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THE PROMISE OF EQUALITY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
POST-BROWN ERA IN VIRGINIA
The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr. *
I have been asked to author an article on the civil rights
movement in Virginia in this anniversary year of the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.' I am happy to
write briefly as to those events of which I am familiar and as to
my view of the civil rights movement in the Commonwealth.
The Supreme Court of the United States is and was the ulti-
mate decider of the meaning of our Constitution. Brown centered
on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, defining that
separate education was not equal education, as intended by the
Constitution. The Brown decision, however, brought an ugly re-
sponse from Virginia. Governor Thomas B. Stanley proposed to
use "every legal means at [his] command to continue segregated
schools."2 Nonetheless, in 1957, Judge Walter Hoffman, in the
case of Atkins v. School Board,3 declared Virginia's massive resis-
tance statutes unconstitutional.4 In response to the Atkins deci-
sion, Harry F. Byrd, then the Senior United States Senator of
Virginia, retorted that Judge Hoffman "has discredited his judi-
* Special Counsel, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia. LL.B., 1942, University
of Richmond School of Law. United States District Judge, 1967-98, Eastern District of
Virginia. In more than thirty years on the federal bench, Judge Merhige presided over not
only the pivotal civil rights cases discussed herein, but also over other landmark cases,
including the A.H. Robins Dalkon Shield case, the Kepone pollution case, and the West-
inghouse uranium litigation.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. BENJAMIN MUSE, VIRGINIA'S MASSIVE RESISTANCE 7 (1961). In a special session of
the Virginia General Assembly, Governor Stanley rejected all other plans for Virginia's
response to the Brown decision, proposing instead to withhold any state funding from any
integrated school. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA: THE BYRD
ORGANIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 44 (1976).
3. 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957).
4. Id. at 446.
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cial robes by acting with such prejudice."5 The Richmond News
Leader referred to Judge Hoffman as a "third rate Republican
politician."6
Likewise, the Governor's successor, J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.,
who took office in January 1958, was an advocate of the same po-
sition. In 1956, Governor Almond, then the Attorney General of
Virginia, criticized the Supreme Court appointments of the pre-
ceding twenty years because they had, in his view, been made
"without regard to fitness or ability."7 He went on to say, "The
appointive power has been desecrated and degraded to the extent
of political depravity for the purpose of paying political debts or
for the purpose of buttressing dubious political programs and
consolidating the political support of minority pressure groups. ''8
As Governor, Almond pledged to "continue with never dimin-
ishing faith and confidence in the rightousness [sic] of [Virginia's]
cause and the hope of ultimate vindication."9 In his 1958 inaugu-
ral address, Almond declared:
I find no area of compromise that might be usefully explored. To
compromise means to integrate.... I cannot conceive such a thing as
a 'little integration' any more than I can conceive a small avalanche
or a modest holocaust.... To sanction any plan which would legalize
the mixing of races in our schools would violate the clear and unmis-
takable mandate of the people.... This, I cannot do.
10
Not all Virginians, regardless of color, supported the political
attitudes of many of its leaders. Regrettably, however, by the fall
of 1958, Governor Almond had closed high schools in Charlottes-
ville, Norfolk, and Warren County, for the obvious purpose of
5. ELY, supra note 2, at 191.
6. Id. "More than any other Virginia federal judge," Ely writes, "Hoffman repre-
sented everything the Byrd organization disliked about the national judiciary." Id.
7. J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Address to the Judicial Conference of Virginia (May 4,
1956) (manuscript on file at the Virginia Historical Society); see ELY, supra note 2, at 4.
Arguing for Virginia in Brown, J. Lindsay Almond warned the Supreme Court that deseg-
regation "'would destroy the public school system of Virginia as we know it today.'" Id.
(citing ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-1955, at 99 (Leon Freidman ed., 1969)).
8. J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Address to the Judicial Conference of Virginia (May 4,
1956) (manuscript on file at the Virginia Historical Society).
9. J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Address to the Virginia General Assembly (Jan. 28, 1959)
(manuscript on file at the Virginia Historical Society).
10. J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Inaugural Address to the Commonwealth and the Virginia
General Assembly (Jan. 11, 1958) (manuscript on file at the Virginia Historical Society).
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avoiding desegregation. 1 Schools for white children opened with
state financial support under the Tuition Grant Program. Even
after public schools were re-opened, for a short period the private
schools continued to prosper and, indeed, I suspect some still do.' 2
Glaringly, Prince Edward County's Board of Supervisors voted
not to appropriate funds for public schools, and those schools, un-
derstandably, were closed.13
Refreshingly, and to its credit, the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, as well as a three-judge federal court in 1959, an-
nounced decisions that undermined the legal foundation of the
obvious state policy of massive resistance. 4
Governor Almond vehemently responded in a radio/television
address to the public in which he vowed, "[W]e have just begun to
fight.""' He went on to speak out against the "false prophets of a
'little or token integration,'" and "those who defend or close their
eyes to the livid stench of sadism, sex, immorality and juvenile
pregnancy infesting the mixed schools of the District of Columbia
and elsewhere." 6 He further pledged, "I will not yield to that
which I know to be wrong and will destroy every rational sem-
blance of public education for thousands of the children in Vir-
ginia." 7 The same Governor, however, later went on to recom-
11. See ELY, supra note 2, at 74-75.
12. See id. As Ely notes, "Newly established private schools and emergency classes in
homes and churches were generally successful in meeting the situation in Warren County
and Charlottesville." Id.
13. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1964).
14. Allen v. County Sch. Bd., 266 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1959); Harrison v. Day, 200
Va. 439, 453, 106 S.E.2d 636, 647-48 (1959).
15. J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Public Address (Jan. 20, 1959) (manuscript on file at the
Virginia Historical Society) [hereinafter Speech of Jan. 20]. See also ALEXANDER
LEIDHOLT, STANDING BEFORE THE SHOUTING MOB 114-15 (1997).
16. J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Speech of Jan. 20.
17. Id. In an address to members of the South Carolina bar, Almond declared, "Any
enactment and any judicial pronouncement which is not under the authority of and pur-
suant to the Constitution does not and cannot bear the halo of 'the supreme law of the
land.'" J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Address to the South Carolina Bar Association (May 2,
1958) (manuscript on file at the Virginia Historical Society). Continuing his theme of up-
holding states' rights in the face of federal judicial intrusion, Governor Almond concluded
that "those who accept the specious theory of constitutional evolution funnell [sic] into the
pillars of our constitutional system the termites of destruction, aided and abetted by a
horde of sycophants, yearning hungrily for the tasty morsels they hope to pluck from the
resulting debris." Id.
2004]
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mend a policy of "passive resistance," or, as he sometimes said,
"containment."8
It is obvious that by that time, for fear of the law of the land be-
ing followed, Governor Almond's rhetoric seemed to have perme-
ated the thinking of most the Commonwealth's political leaders.
Indeed, the General Assembly of Virginia passed the Tuition
Grant Law 9 and repealed the Compulsory Attendance Law2" as
the Governor had recommended. It was the view of a commission
appointed by Governor Almond" that a policy of "freedom of
choice" and "local option" in dealing with school desegregation
was the proper course.22 The commission adopted the recommen-
dations of the Governor, who said, "If we fail to prevent integra-
tion in the schools of Virginia, it is not because we have not tried.
It is not because we have not evoked every resource known to the
institution of the system in which we live."23
By early 1959, state and federal courts demolished the policies
of overt massive resistance in Virginia.24 Virginia then turned to
18. See ELY, supra note 2, at 124. Despite his many "'emotional appeal[s]' and ha-
ranguing 'in demagogic fashion,'" Almond ultimately relinquished his hard-line position on
public school segregation. Id. As Ely notes, "Almond urged the legislature to repeal both
the massive resistance laws declared unconstitutional and the compulsory attendance law,
and he strongly backed a revised and broadened tuition grant program." Id. at 124. In an
address to the General Assembly, who had been called into special session, Almond "an-
nounced his surrender." Id. at 123.
It is not enough for gentlemen to cry unto you and me, "Don't give up the
ship," "Stop them," "It must not happen," or "It can be prevented." If any of
them knows the way through the dark maze of judicial aberration and consti-
tutional exploitation, I call upon them to shed the light for which Virginia
stands in dire need in this her dark and agonizing hour. No fair minded per-
son would be so unreasonable as to seek to hold me responsible for failure to
exercise powers which the state is powerless to bestow.
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Speech before the Virginia General Assembly (Jan. 28, 1959)
(manuscript on file at the Virginia Historical Society), quoted in ELY, supra note 2, at 123.
19. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 222 & n.3 (1964).
20. See id. at 222 & n.4.
21. The Governor designated the Perrow Commission to devise a permissible and
practicable means of school integration. Ely, supra note 2, at 128. The Commission was
headed by State Senator Mosby G. Perrow, Jr. and, though ostensibly representative of
the Commonwealth, included many die-hard massive resisters, including future Governor
Mills Godwin. ELY, supra note 2, at 128.
22. See Griffin, 377 U.S. at 222.
23. J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Speech before the Virginia General Assembly (Apr. 6,
1959) (manuscript on file at the Virginia Historical Society).
24. By 1959, both state and national political pressures had severely weakened the
control of the "Byrd machine," which had driven the politics of massive resistance. ELY,
supra note 2, at 140-43. As Ralph McGill, the editor of the Atlanta Constitution an-
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tokenism. The power to assign all children to schools was given to
a single state board. While racism as a reason for assignment to a
particular school was carefully omitted, if a black child attempted
to attend what was considered a white school, he or she was sub-
jected to aptitude and achievement tests, hearings, etc. Simulta-
neous therewith, tuition grants were permitted, which, as one
would anticipate, encouraged the establishment of private
schools, and as such created an escape hatch for white students
who objected to sharing classrooms with blacks. Tuition grants in
general were limited to non-sectarian schools.25
By 1963, Surry County public schools were ordered desegre-
gated; so all the white children withdrew and enrolled in a new
private school for whites. Powhatan County schools also desegre-
gated in the fall of that year, and a private school for white stu-
dents was formed. In that community, however, a group of par-
ents joined in an organization they called "Citizens for Public
Education" with the purpose of encouraging as many students as
possible to remain in the public schools. Many white students did,
though the vast majority went to private schools.
In a challenge to the "freedom of choice" plan employed in New
Kent County, the trial court held that freedom of choice was con-
stitutional and approved the operation of freedom of choice.26 The
population was just about equally divided between blacks and
whites. No white student had chosen to attend what was the all-
black school; a few black students enrolled in a formerly all-white
school." In short, approximately eighty-five percent of the black
students were still attending what was the old black school at the
time of the Supreme Court's ruling.2"
On May 27, 1968, the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored
by Justice Brennan, held:
nounced, "Virginia's Byrd machine.., is broken .... the Byrd machine has been knocked
out.'" Id. at 143.
25. Many of these mechanisms of "passive" resistance were formulated by the Perrow
Commission. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
the Perrow Commission and the legislation that arose from it, see ELY, supra note 2, at
128-35.
26. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1967).
27. Id. at 433.
28. Ronald J. Bacigal & Margaret I. Bacigal, A Case Study of the Federal Judiciary's
Role in Court-Ordered Busing: The Professional and Personal Experiences of U.S. District
Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr., 3 J.L. & POL. 693, 697 (1986-87).
20041
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The pattern of separate "white" and "Negro" schools in the New Kent
County school system established under compulsion of state laws is
precisely the pattern of segregation to which Brown I and Brown II
were particularly addressed, and which Brown I declared unconsti-
tutionally denied Negro school children equal protection of the
laws.
29
Identification with the New Kent school system, which was
composed of two schools, extended not only to the composition of
the student bodies of those schools in the county, but every facet
of school operation-faculty, staff, as well as extracurricular ac-
tivities and facilities.3 °
In short, the Court held that "freedom of choice" was not, in
and of itself, unconstitutional.31 The decision pointed out, how-
ever, that only if such a plan proved effective would it be accept-
able, but if it failed, as it did in that case, other means must be
used to achieve the required result.32 The Court, quoting from
Judge Sobeloff, then of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, said, "School officials have the continuing duty to
take whatever action may be necessary to create a 'unitary, non-
racial system."'33
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit, in a case dealing with
Charles City County, Bowman v. County School Board,34 had held
that "[s]ince the plaintiffs here concede that their annual choice
[of school] is unrestricted and unencumbered, we find in its exis-
tence no denial of any constitutional right not to be subjected to
racial discrimination."35 The Bowman case mandated a plan to
create meaningful and immediate progress toward establishing
state imposed segregation.36 The Supreme Court, in Green, left
little doubt that the burden was on the school board "to come for-
ward with a plan that promise[d] realistically to work, and prom-
ise[d] realistically to work now."37 The utilization of the word
"now" was the catalyst of desegregation.
29. Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 439-40.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 440 (quoting Bowman v. School Board, 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967)).
34. 382 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1967).
35. Id. at 328.
36. Id. at 329.
37. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
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Prior statements by appellate courts unintentionally gave hope
to those who approved of segregated schools by the fact that many
contained language such as:
[Elducation of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a
matter belonging to the respective states, and any interference on
the part of Federal authority with the management of such schools
cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and unmistakable
disregard of rights guaranteed by the law of the land.3 s
Even the Fourth Circuit in the Green case, by its opinion, inad-
vertently failed to direct immediate desegregation. 39 To its credit,
the Supreme Court, in its Green opinion, left no such encourage-
ment of continued segregation by its mandate that desegregation
of our public schools required immediate action by the respective
school boards.4 °
I was sworn in as a United States District Judge on August 20,
1967. Over ten years had passed since the Supreme Court's refu-
tation of the "separate but equal" doctrine. Yet, public schools in
Richmond, and, indeed, in much of Virginia, remained rigidly
segregated. Virginia had led the South in massive resistance to
the Supreme Court's edict that the school system should be inte-
grated with "all deliberate speed."41 Virginia's response to the de-
cisions in Brown and Green was absolute defiance, with the im-
plicit suggestion that if one did not agree with the decision of the
Supreme Court, it was to be ignored.42
By 1959, Virginia's strategy of massive resistance faltered as it
became clear that the federal courts would not turn a blind eye
toward what amounted to overt state-enforced segregation.4 1 Seg-
regationists, in Virginia, as throughout the South, became more
creative, relying on comments like Judge Parker's pronouncement
38. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 532 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (quoting Cumming v. Rich-
mond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899)).
39. See County Sch. Bd. v. Green, 382 F.2d 338, 339 (4th Cir. 1967)
40. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
41. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
42. Mills Godwin, a State Senator, who would later serve as Governor, was a member
of the Perrow Commission, but nonetheless an outspoken resister of desegregation. "Inte-
gration," he once said, "would be a cancer eating at the very lifeblood of our public educa-
tion system."
43. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
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that the Constitution "does not require integration, it merely for-
bids discrimination."44
Under freedom of choice plans, each student was assigned to a
particular school, usually the neighborhood school the child had
been attending previously.45 Because housing was strictly segre-
gated both by the law and by custom, the racial composition of
the schools reflected the lack of racial diversity in the neighbor-
hoods. All students were then allowed a "free transfer" to the
school of the student's choice.46 In most instances, this meant that
a small percentage of the black students would choose to attend
the previously all-white schools, while no whites would attend the
black schools.47 "Black schools" and "white schools" thus remained
generally in place.
Many viewed freedom of choice plans as a moderate and rea-
sonable response to the desegregation question. Indeed, prior to
my appointment to the federal bench and the issuance of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Green v. County School Board, the
United States District Court in Richmond supported such plans.4"
Ultimately, the constitutionality of those plans was challenged
in the Supreme Court. In his argument to the high court, State
Senator Fredrick T. Gray articulated Virginia's defense of the
freedom of choice plan:
The state may remain neutral with respect to private racial dis-
crimination. Desegregation (i.e., the elimination of state enforced
segregation solely because of race) is a legal question; integration
(i.e., the compulsory assignment of pupils to achieve intermingling)
is an educational question-best left for decision by educators, for
educational purposes, on the basis of educational criteria. A freedom
of choice plan alone honors this distinction.
49
The Supreme Court rejected Virginia's freedom of choice plan
based on evidence that the plan was ineffective as a tool of deseg-
regation."° The Court observed that after nearly three years of
operation, the freedom of choice plan utilized by New Kent
44. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F.Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
45. Green, 391 U.S. at 433-34.
46. Id.
47. For additional discussion of the "freedom of choice" plan and Virginia's move to-
ward "tokenism," see ELY, supra note 2, at 129-30.
48. Green, 391 U.S. at 434.
49. Brief for Respondents at 32, Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (No.
67-695). See Bacigal & Bacigal, supra note 28, at 697.
50. Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42.
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County had failed to achieve a unitary school system.51 Eighty-
five percent of the black children remained in the traditionally
all-black school, while not a single white child attended the
same.12 The Supreme Court further held that New Kent County's
freedom of choice plan impermissibly placed the burden of dis-
mantling the dual school system on children and parents, rather
than on the school board as Brown had dictated.53
The message of Green v. County School Board was inescapable:
the Supreme Court was now mandating results. As one commen-
tary has noted, with Green, the Supreme Court recognized that,
"Centuries of discrimination could not be overcome by benign in-
difference."54 And thus the courts' position shifted from "Thou
shalt not segregate" to the position that "Thou shalt integrate
[now]."
The Supreme Court's decision in Green came down on May 28,
1968, some nine months after I had been sworn in as a United
States District Court Judge. Upon hearing of the Supreme
Court's decision, I naively thought that the era of resistance to
desegregation in Virginia school systems, whether through overt
or indirect means, was coming to a close. Adherence to the law
was something I took for granted. The "all deliberate speed"
mandate of Brown had inadvertently invited delay. Reasonable
individuals differed on whether Brown required integration or
merely prohibited overt state-sanctioned discrimination. Now
that the Supreme Court affirmatively and unequivocally required
school districts to take direct action to achieve integration, I na-
ively expected prompt, if begrudging, compliance.
The day after Virginia's freedom of choice plan was struck
down in Green, Samuel W. Tucker, who had argued the case for
the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court, came to my chambers seek-
ing a hearing date in reference to that case. His motion was fol-
lowed in rapid succession with motions to reopen each and every
school case that had come through the Richmond division. The
exact number escapes me, but I am reasonably certain that be-
tween the school cases within the jurisdiction of the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia and those which my colleague Judge Dalton of
51. Id. at 441.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 441-42.
54. Bacigal & Bacigal, supra note 28, at 697.
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the Western District asked me to handle, I found myself with in
excess of forty school cases.
The Supreme Court announced in Green that the "obligation of
the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effec-
tiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation.""5 In fair-
ness, however, it must be noted that even federal judges acting
out of sincere motivations differed on what the law required.
Mills Godwin quoted United States District Judge Walter Hoff-
man, a judge well known for his firm upholding of the mandates
of the Supreme Court in reference to Brown and its progeny, as
saying that it was "difficult to understand just what the law re-
quired." Fortunately, the Green case removed any such difficulty
and I promptly inquired of the school boards as to whether deseg-
regation was in effect.
In my view, the Supreme Court could not have been more em-
phatic. In its unanimous opinion, the Court held that: "The bur-
den on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now."56 In recollection, the Green v. County School Board case was
unimaginably very simple. New Kent County's utilization of the
freedom of choice plan had effectively maintained the patterns of
segregation that had previously been mandated by the law. New
Kent County had only two schools; there was a white school and
the other, an all-black school. The only way to desegregate those
schools was to make one a grammar school and the other a high
school. To me, as a judge, the solution seemed obvious.
New Kent's initial defense was that to convert the schools
would require extensive renovations. Though the plaintiffs con-
tended that the schools could be ready for desegregation within a
matter of weeks, the defendants insisted that the anticipated
renovation would take considerably longer. The tactics used by
the New Kent School Board were not unlike those used by the
leadership of other localities.
Whenever possible, I tried to proceed slowly to give the com-
munity time to adjust. Unfortunately, my attempts to accommo-
date the communities only led to more delay-school districts ar-
gued that they needed more time to convert an all-white school
55. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
56. Id.
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into a racially mixed grammar school. The school board cited such
renovation as lowering the urinals so that the younger students
could be accommodated. Because the school board made the
claim, a fact-finding mission was required to determine the uri-
nals were not in fact excessively high.
Insofar as the physical context of desegregation, I was con-
stantly reminded that President Nixon was opposed to what be-
came the favored political subject-busing---despite the fact that
busing did not begin with school desegregation.57 In the counties
where there were great distances between schools, busing chil-
dren to school was simply a fact of life. Busing thus had been em-
ployed in Virginia for many years prior to the Supreme Court's
action, although busing was generally utilized only for the benefit
of white students. Mr. Tucker asserted that when he attended
grammar school, only white children were afforded the use of
buses. Black children were, if they wished to attend, forced to
walk to school regardless of the distance.
58
Busing, though necessary, became a reason for disagreeing
with integration plans. Indeed, in some instances, the practical
argument against busing could be easily made. Time spent riding
to and from school was, and is, largely unproductive-
nevertheless, because of the physical locations of schools, it was
necessary. In cities such as Richmond, generally the schools for
whites were in much better condition than the schools in black
neighborhoods. The bottom line was that the children were, in
fact, paying for the conduct of prior generations who had main-
tained, by custom and law, segregated neighborhoods.
More than forty school cases were heard in turn and the court
repeatedly ordered the various school boards to abandon freedom
of choice plans in favor of plans that would effectively desegregate
their schools. The response of the community was both rapid and
large. I was told at the time that the local newspapers were con-
tinually critical of the court's action and expressed their criticism
almost daily in both their editorials and the printing of letters
from the public.
57. See Lee A. Daniels, In Defense of Busing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1983, § 6 at 34.
58. Reflecting on his experiences, Mr. Tucker once said, "I got involved in the civil
rights movement on June 18, 1913, in Alexandria-I was born black." Bacigal & Bacigal,
supra note 28, at 700.
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The opposition was continuous. Letters were literally brought
into my office, and the threats were of a serious enough nature to
cause the marshal service to assign between eight and eleven
marshals to guard my home on a twenty-four-hour-a-day basis, to
accompany my youngest son to school, and my wife whenever she
left the property. For about two years I never left my home when
I was not accompanied by one or more United States Marshals.
The United States Attorney's Office reported to me that on at
least two occasions one or more persons endeavored to solicit
money to be used to hire someone to assassinate me.
It was, indeed, an unpleasant time for me and my family. In
the interim, my dog was shot, my guest house was burned to the
ground, and calls for my impeachment emanated not only from
what might be described as "ordinary citizens," but from state
legislators, at least one United States Senator, and one Con-
gressman. Indbed, my sole claim to fame is that at one point my
name was substituted for that of Chief Justice Warren on a bill-
board which firmly read "Impeachable."
I foolishly believed that the public, though perhaps reluctant,
would accept the law as the law. Those who threatened not only
me, but the welfare of my family, and those who picketed the
courthouse by the hundreds, in my opinion, were totally irrespon-
sible and totally ignorant of the fact that ours is a country of law.
One could understand resentment about a judge if, for example,
he were entering decrees which affected so many people and
those decrees were continually reversed on appeal, but such was
not the situation. Of the more than forty desegregation cases I
decided, only one or two did not stand on appeal.
Among those cases was the Emporia case which was reversed
by my Court of Appeals, which in turn was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court, asserting my decree.59 The other
case was the Richmond Consolidation case, Bradley v. School
Board,6" which was also reversed by my Court of Appeals. As a
former member of the Richmond School Board, Justice Powell de-
clined to participate in it.
59. See Wright v. County Sch. Bd, 309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1970), rev'd. 442 F.2d
570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
60. 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1973), affid by an
equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
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It would be unfair to leave the impression that every citizen
acted irresponsibly. Many were courageous. Governor Holton, in
particular, who had children of school age, publicly escorted them
to public schools in accord with the desegregation decree. 6' The
Governor's actions were even more remarkable given that be-
cause the Governor's Mansion was located on state, not city,
property, the Governor's children were technically exempt from
the Court's busing order. His actions brought criticism from a
segment of the public, but his courage was a great source of com-
fort to me. Indeed, his actions helped to alleviate my concern that
I had unfairly subjected my own family to danger.
Among others who demonstrated courage in their vocal support
of quiet adherence to the law, was my friend, J. Sargeant Rey-
nolds, a State Senator and then Lieutenant Governor. There
were, I am sure, many others, though most local political leaders,
by their silence, left little doubt as to their feelings of discontent.
Of course, I will never forget the tenacious courage of Samuel
Tucker, who was a law partner of Oliver Hill. Mr. Tucker was
counsel for the plaintiffs in many of the cases. Neither will I for-
get the many defense lawyers, such as my late colleague, D.
Dortch Warriner, who, though disagreeing with the Court's de-
cree, refused to participate in encouraging the personal attacks
on me and my family.
It has been many years since the rendering of the famous
Brown and Green decisions. It would appear that we have made
progress-though hopefully not as much as we will in the future.
African Americans are at long last receiving, to a great extent,
the treatment and vision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Our citi-
zenry is at long last conscious of the educational depravation to
which some of our citizens have been subjected and time, moral-
ity, and the law give great promise of ultimate equality in educa-
tion as well as in other aspects of our lives. For this we are grate-
ful.
61. See Michael Paul Williams, Toasting Titans of Racial Justice, RICH. TIMES
DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 2001, at B1.
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